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3Introduction
On the 20th of February 1976, Emmanuel Levinas held a lecture titled “How to Think Nothingness?” as
a part of his lecture series Death and Time (La mort et le temps, published in Dieu, la mort et le temps, 1993).
There Levinas argued that even if nothingness intimates itself in various experiences of anxiety and
horror, its refractory and unthematizable character eludes philosophical grasp. The very structure of
intentionality, the fact that consciousness is always turned toward something, makes it impossible to
intentionally aim at nothing. “Nothingness has defied Western thought,” Levinas concluded.i However,
despite its refractory character – or perhaps precisely because of it – nothingness has been a recurrent
theme in 20th century phenomenology, and as an outcome one can approach it from several perspectives,
ranging from Sartre’s notion of nothingness as the negation of being to Levinas’s own notion of
nothingness as the irremissible fullness of being.
In this article, I wish to inquire that if nothingness defies thinking, would it nevertheless be possible to
paint it? Could something as utterly invisible and immaterial as nothingness be captured in the
concreteness of paint? To be more precise, what would it mean to paint nothingness in the sense Levinas
himself understands it, as the il  y a? In asking this, I wish to widen the phenomenological discussion
concerning the pictorial depiction of nothingness, which has so far primarily employed Sartrean and
Heideggerian perspectives. The Levinasian il y a has been extensively discussed in relation to literature by
Maurice Blanchot and his commentators, but the discussion on the pictorial depiction of the il y a has
remained non-existent. I wish to suggest some ways in which the experience of the il y a can be brought
about with pictorial means by interpreting the interior painting of the Danish painter Vilhelm
Hammershøi (1864–1916), one of the best known Scandinavian painters.
I  will  first  briefly  outline  some examples  of  the  Sartrean  and  Heideggerian  perspectives  in  which  the
relationship between painting and nothingness has been discussed. Then I will introduce Levinas’s notion
of the il y a in some depth, and finally discuss the enigmatic, oppressive atmosphere of Hammershøi’s
interiors, which, as I will argue, is best understood precisely in terms of the il  y  a. Through a detailed
analysis of Hammershøi’s compositional techniques, I aim to show how figurative means can evoke an
experience of a modality of presence which eludes reification.
Grasping nothing
The relationship between painting and nothingness has not been at the forefront of phenomenological
discussions, even if both art and nothingness have gained much attention in existential phenomenology.
To contextualise my interpretation of Levinas and Hammershøi, I will first briefly outline some aspects
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in three forms, one of which comes from Sartre and two from Heidegger.
In Being and Nothingness (L’Être et le néant, 1943) Jean-Paul Sartre understands nothingness in terms of a
negation which consciousness brings into existence.ii Consciousness, the for-itself, is essentially a power of
negation by which consciousness is able to set itself apart from the world (and from itself, for that matter).
In other words, consciousness as intentional activity is possible only because it can sever, or nihilate, the
plenitude of being into non-identical phenomena, thus inserting nothingness into the midst of being.
Jeffrey Weiss has interpreted Mark Rothko’s paintings in terms of this Sartrean nothingness, arguing that
they stage a similar “double negation” as Pierre’s absence in the famous section of Being and Nothingness:
in the same way as Pierre’s absence makes Sartre, who seeks him, identify everything in the café as not-
Pierre and experience the whole place filled by this absence, Rothko’s paintings perform a nihilation,
where consciousness is unable to fathom any figures, and the remaining colour fields are consequently
haunted by a presence of absence.iii
Martin Heidegger’s thinking affords not one but two ways of thinking about nothingness. The first of
these is the discussion in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927) on the nothingness of death, in the face of
which the finitude and contingency of Dasein’s existence are disclosed.iv In anxiety, Dasein is forced out
of the inauthentic They (das Man), into which Dasein escapes in an attempt to evade the burden of assuming
its unique and finite self, and forced to face the possibility of death, which it cannot outstrip. In this
experience of the slipping-away of the world, Heidegger argues, nothingness intimates itself. For
Heidegger, this experience is not necessarily a crippling one but profoundly empowering: in resolutely
facing its impending nothingness, Dasein assumes its authentic self as a unique “ability-to-be” and thus
takes responsibility for its finite existence.v Natalie Kosoi has argued that it is precisely this experience,
and not the Sartrean variety, which is staged in Rothko’s paintings.vi According to Kosoi, the dynamics
of Rothko’s colour fields visually represent the slipping-away of the world, forbidding us from
distinguishing any figures in them and thus making sense of them as constellations of meaning. These
hovering, indistinct shapes “undermine our ability to read the colors of the forms depicted in his paintings
as well as the space in which they are situated,” thus enacting the collapse of the everyday world in an
experience of anxiety.vii Kosoi argues that in this way Rothko’s paintings “intimate mortality” and force
us to face our unique ability-to-be in the face of this painted nothingness.viii
The second Heideggerian interpretation stems from the period following Being and Time. Before
Heidegger came up with the vocabulary of his later thinking, nothingness was one of the terms he began to
use to denote the aspect of concealment and withdrawal embedded in the process of unconcealment, or
the disclosure of meaningful presence.ix In this development, nothingness no longer denotes the
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which presence becomes possible. Iain Thomson has argued that Heidegger’s discussion of Van Gogh’s
shoe painting in the Introduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in die Metaphysik, 1935) and The Origin of the Work
of Art (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, 1935–36) aims to articulate this dynamic relationship between
nothingness and presence.x Though Heidegger himself  is  not explicit  on this  matter,  Thomson argues
that Heidegger’s insistent use of enigmatic formulations such as “Surrounding this pair of farmer's shoes
there is nothing” and “A pair of farmer’s shoes and nothing more” betray his interest in the way the
indistinct background of the painting and the depicted shoes illustrate the rising of presence from
nothingness. Thus, in Thomson’s interpretation, Heidegger approaches the relationship between painting
and nothingness not in terms of the painting’s ability to induce anxiety, but in terms of its capacity of
staging the process by which the Open is constituted.xi
In sum, the three main perspectives concerning the pictorial depiction of nothingness conceive
nothingness as 1) the negation of being, 2) the nothingness of death, and 3) nothingness as the element
of concealment. In the following, I wish to take up a fourth notion, one very different to the ones
mentioned: the Levinasian il y a.
Nothing that remains
In the lecture series Death and Time Levinas makes the following comparison between two forms of
nothingness:
In death, as pure nothingness, as foundationlessness – which we feel more dramatically, with the
acuteness of that nothingness that is greater in death than in the idea of nothingness of being (in the
there is [il y a], which wounds less than disappearance does) – we arrive at something that European
philosophy has not thought.xii
The lectures themselves are devoted to the “pure nothingness” of death and leave out the latter form,
the “nothingness of being,” the il y a. However, it is precisely this form of nothingness that interests me
in this article.
The il y a is a major preoccupation in Levinas’s early writings, especially in Time and the Other (Le temps et
l’autre, lecture series held in 1946–47) and Existence and Existents (De l’existence à l’existant, 1947). Already
at this stage of his career, before the radical otherness of the other person gains centre stage in his
thinking, Levinas is preoccupied with the paradox that will animate his whole philosophical oeuvre.
Would it be possible to think phenomenologically of something that strictly speaking never enters the
order of phenomenality? Could one describe, while staying true to phenomenology, something that
exceeds the limits of phenomenology? The problem of the il y a represents Levinas’s early encounter with
this paradox.
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from presence while acting as its constitutive part, for Levinas nothingness as the il  y  a denotes
paradoxically the insistence of being that remains even when every existent thing is removed from the
world. The il y a is thus an anonymous, formless, and indeterminable presence tucked away under the
entities that clutter my world. In Time and the Other, Levinas introduces the notion by way of a thought
experiment:
Let us image all things, beings and persons, returning to nothingness. Do we encounter pure nothingness?
What remains after this imaginary destruction of everything is not something, but the fact that there is [il y
a]. The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the place where the bottom has dropped out of
everything, an atmospheric density, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence. There is, after this
destruction of things and beings, the impersonal “field of forces” of existing. There is something that is
neither subject nor substantive. The fact of existing imposes itself when there is no longer anything. […]
It is the irremissibility of existing.xiii
In Levinas’s early work this experience gains the name il  y  a.  As  William  Large  has  pointed  out,  the
vanishing of the world and self into nothingness should not be understood categorically as an actual
disappearance, but rather as an existential mood akin to Heideggerian anxiety: it is an experience that
affects the very way the subject exists.xiv Since this experience has to do with a presence that cannot be
reified or aimed at in any intentional act, Levinas takes up a strategy that brings him to the very limits of
phenomenology.  In a way reminiscent of the later Levinas, who describes the trace of the other’s face
through an indirect phenomenology, where its radical otherness is approached “by situating it with
respect to the phenomenology it interrupts,”xv the early Levinas describes the il y a through the way it
disturbs our quotidian ways of existing. This description can be broken down into the following elements.
Haunting presence. In everyday life, we are usually absorbed in the activity that consumes our attention. The
world offers me shelter and refuge by succumbing to my needs and sustaining me, becoming something
I “live from” (vivre de…).xvi In this immediate and primary relationship with the world, my self-relation is
unreflective: I can escape from myself to the world which nourishes me.xvii However, there are times, like
in the midst of insomnia – Levinas’s favourite example – when the world turns against me. In the dead
of night, when sleep escapes me, I am stripped of the possibility of fleeing from my predicament and
rendered impotent in the suffocating embrace of the night.xviii Everything slips into darkness, yet
something remains: the night itself watches.xix The world becomes uncanny and filled with an ominous,
oppressing presence, “like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to no one.”xx This presence
estranges me from my world,  which no longer facilitates dwelling and offers no refuge.  There is  only
silence, but this silence is no emblem of peace: “nothing approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens;
this silence, this tranquillity, this void of sensations constitutes a mute, absolutely indeterminate menace,”
Levinas writes and continues: “There is no determinate being, anything can count for anything else. In
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Levinas means by nothingness – an anonymous presence that cannot be assigned to anything, a no-thingness
– which has to be distinguished from the “pure” nothingness of death:
The horror of the night, as an experience of the there is, does not then reveal to us a danger of death,
nor even a danger of pain. That is what is essential in this analysis. The pure nothingness revealed
by anxiety in Heidegger’s analysis does not constitute the there is. There is horror of being and not
anxiety over nothingness, fear of being and not fear for being; there is being prey to, delivered over
to something that is not a ‘something.’ When night [sic] is dissipated with the first rays of the sun,
the horror of the night is no longer definable. The “something” appears to be “nothing.”xxii
Solitude. For Levinas, the everyday world is always shared with others: it is the very presence of the other
that opens the possibility of being in contact with the outside world. In the experience of the night, these
intersubjective ties are severed. The subject, “in participating the there is, finds itself again to be a solitude,
in the definitiveness of the bond with which the ego is chained to itself.”xxiii Part of the il y a’s acuteness
lies in the very impotence by which I become unable to save myself from its paralysing presence. Time
and again Levinas will argue that there are no possibilities I might assume to save myself; it is only the
other that can dissipate the il y a and salvage me from my suffering.xxiv
Passivity. The horror of insomnia lies in the fact that I cannot escape it. The night strips me of the
possibility of evasion, and I find myself chained to the night like Prometheus to his rock, utterly exposed
and  unable  to  take  shelter.  The il  y  a suspends my ability-to-be, that is, my ability to transcend my
interiority and project myself towards the world, and unearths a more primordial, passive layer of
subjectivity. Stripped of the possibility of assuming my possibilities, I become “a vigilance without
possible recourse to sleep,”xxv pure  exposure  to  anonymous,  passive  being.  In  these  moments  I  am
overtaken, as Kris Sealey says, by “a feeling of being an existent, no longer (or rather, not yet) a locus of
possibility, but instead, a vulnerability under the burden of having to exist.”xxvi The il  y  a reduces my
subjectivity to pure nakedness preceding the ability-to-be, which defines Heideggerian Dasein. This way
the Levinasian experience of nothingness differs in crucial ways from Heidegger’s empowering anxiety,
which opens the possibility for Dasein to  affirm  its  authentic  existence.  For  Levinas,  the il  y  a is an
experience of utter passivity and impotence, which oppresses rather than liberates:
Being toward death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a supreme lucidity and hence a supreme
virility. It is Dasein’s assumption of the uttermost possibility of existence, and consequently makes
possible the very feat of grasping a possibility – that is, it makes possible activity and freedom.
Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the subject seems to reach the limit of
the possible in suffering. It finds itself enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive.xxvii
Breakdown of intentionality and the interior-exterior-divide. The absorption into everyday activities, the very
movement by which I move outside myself, is by nature intentional: I direct my attention to this or that
activity and choose the objects to which I attach myself. Such intentional activity is precisely a movement
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from my enchainment to myself.xxviii The il y a, however, offers no such refuge. Since the presence of the
il y a is not localizable to any object, it thwarts intentionality: there is nothing exterior in the night toward
which I could aim my attention. I become subject to the night, and not the other way round. This
incapability of immersing oneself into anything exterior turns one towards their interiority, or, to be more
precise, breaks down the very distinction between interiority and exteriority:
There is transcends inwardness as well as exteriority; it does not even make it possible to distinguish
these. The anonymous current of being invades, submerges every subject, person, or thing. The
subject-object distinction by which we approach existents is not the starting point for a mediation
which broaches being in general.xxix
In other words, the unreflective self-mediation, which characterises everyday intentionality, is reversed
so that I become all too acutely aware of myself as being chained to the night. This self-presence cannot
be readily distinguished from the oppressive presence of the night itself  – as William Large says,  “my
interiority is turned inside out like a glove.”xxx
Encapsulation of time. Finally, the experience of the il y a is for Levinas very much tied to the experience of
time. In the dead of night, the clock ticks, but time does not move: I find myself riveted to an encapsulated
instant,  which  is  pure  duration  without  future,  and  all  I  can  do  is  wait.xxxi Behind this description lies
Levinas’s insistence that temporality is not the achievement of a solitary subject, but a dimension afforded
only in and through intersubjectivity: time is the gift of the other.xxxii The only thing the solitary subject
can give themselves is an instant (l’instant), which lacks ecstatic openness to the future.xxxiii Since the il y a
severs intersubjective bonds, it is also a closure of time proper: the subject is chained to the instant,
frozen in futureless duration without exit.
Rooms full of nothing
The relationship between the il y a and art has been widely discussed in the context of literature, especially
since Blanchot made the experience of the il  y  a a central theme in his literary theory.xxxiv Here  I  am
interested in whether the il  y  a could be evoked through pictorial depiction. Would it be possible to
transform the physical medium of paint and canvas into an evocation of a presence which eludes
reification?
Levinas’s own writings suggest that there might be a relationship between the il y a and painting (and art
in general), but these remarks are somewhat ambiguous, and they need to be discussed in some other
instance.xxxv Instead, let me turn to some concrete examples, which in my view confirm the possibility of
pictorially evoking the il y a. In the following, I aim to show how the il y a can be found from the most
unlikely of places: a quaint bourgeois apartment in the heart of Copenhagen.
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apartment on Copenhagen’s Strandgade 30. Interiors of bourgeois homes became a fashionable genre in
Denmark’s art scene in the 1880’s, and before Hammershøi painters like Peter Ilsted and Carl Holsøe
had already popularised the genre of ascetic depictions of women’s everyday life.xxxvi However, what sets
Hammershøi apart from his contemporaries is the way he strips his interiors of all anecdotal material,
refrains from social commentary, and uses his apartment as a source of painterly experimentation on
light, space, and geometric compositions.xxxvii Though his oeuvre does entail a significant amount of
portraits, landscapes, and Copenhagen’s cityscapes, I shall limit my discussion to his interior paintings,
since it is in them that this omission gains its most pressing phenomenological effect.
My aim in the following analysis is not to speculate anything about Hammershøi’s personal intentions,
or otherwise impose upon the paintings a symbolising reading. Indeed,  Poul Vad and Görel Cavalli-
Björkman have both warned against the temptation of seeking some deeper symbolic or esoteric meaning
in Hammershøi’s atmospheric interiors, simply because he saw himself as painting the home he loved
and aimed to capture merely “the visible and the concrete” (det synlige og konkrete) and paint “the
phenomenology of elements” (elementens fænomenologi).xxxviii By delving into the way Hammershøi paints the
visible and the concrete, I aim to show that he also manages to paint a mode of presence that exceeds the
visible and the concrete – the nothingness of the il y a. In other words, I will discuss how, paradoxically,
Hammershøi brings out something radically non-figurative using solely figurative means.
My main claim is that it is precisely Hammershøi’s rendering of the utterly invisible and non-concrete by
staying firmly within the plane of the visible and concrete that opens a new vista for the thinking of
painting's relationship to nothingness. In contrast to Van Gogh’s shoes and Rothko’s colour fields,
Hammershøi’s interiors are outside the logic of transition between the figurative and the abstract, upon
which earlier phenomenological discussions on painting and nothingness depend. What I wish to suggest
is that precisely by staying strictly on the figurative plane, Hammershøi can intimate absence in the heart
of presence instead of painting absence in opposition to presence.
On the face of it, Hammershøi’s interiors are very traditional, representational images of an apartment
and its  puritan décor.  And yet  – the rooms feel  somehow deserted,  devoid of life,  and haunted by an
almost tangible sense of absence. The silence of the rooms is wrought with tension, a feeling of
foreboding, as if something was about to happen any minute. But nothing ever happens: the interiors
close in on themselves, frozen in eternal tranquillity of a Sunday afternoon, whose motionless quietude
begins to border on claustrophobia. Time stands still. Only dust particles dance in the sunbeams. A
solitary figure, a woman dressed black (modelled after the painter’s wife Ida), sometimes lingers in the
rooms, often with her back facing the viewer, but she remains distant, unreachable, enclosed within
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herself. It would be pushing it too far to describe the paintings in the dramatic way Levinas speaks of the
horrors of the night – and yet, there is something haunting, oppressive, and unnerving in them that is
very similar to the Levinasian experience of the il y a. It is this connection I wish to pursue further in this
article.
Fig. 2
Vilhelm Hammershøi: Interior with the Artist’s Easel, 1910
Oil on canvas
Statens Museum for Kunst, Denmark
CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication
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Hammershøi is often described as a painter of silence.xxxix While I do agree on the point that silence plays
a crucial role in his paintings, this must be qualified further. There are, after all, many different sorts of
silence: think of the tranquil silence of nature in midsummer twilight, the tragic silence of funerals, or the
awkward silence that disrupts a conversation. The silence in Hammershøi’s interiors is an enigmatically
oppressive and suffocating form of silence, which opens them to a Levinasian interpretation. In the
following, I will trace some essential ways in which Hammershøi’s compositional techniques achieve their
effect. My main aim is to show how these pictorial means, despite being wholly figurative, have a similar
effect on the viewer as the night on the insomniac, thus evoking an impersonal and haunting presence
analogous, if not identical, to the Levinasian il y a.
Pictorial space. The  single  most  crucial  element  in  the  overall  effect  of  Hammershøi’s  interiors  is  the
construction of the pictorial space itself. Here the painter employs two compositional strategies, which
together form an illusion of an enclosed void. Firstly, the objects in the interiors, mostly furniture, are
usually pushed against the walls and away from the viewer’s vantage point, so that the pictorial space
comprises of an uninterrupted void.  Yet the way Hammershøi depicts the apartment is marked with an
acute sense of claustrophobia, as if the apartment was shut tight and enclosed from the outside world.
Hammershøi achieves this effect primarily by the use of doors and windows. The doors, usually closed
or half open, never offer a passage outside; at best, they open onto another room, like a Chinese puzzle
box (see Fig. 1). If the viewer’s gaze is allowed to go beyond the room closest to the viewer’s vantage
point, the gaze is trumped from reaching the outside world by a closed door or a wall in the next room.
This way, “his interiors depict a system of rooms, which close around themselves like a labyrinth,” as
Görel Cavalli-Björkman notes.xl Even  windows,  when  they  are  painted  –  most  often  the  interior  is
depicted from an angle in which the windows are not directly visible (see Fig. 2) – they remain opaque;
as  Anne  Hemkendreis  observes,  the  windows  in  Hammershøi’s  rooms  fail  “to  establish  a  system  of
reference between the inner and the outer world.”xli The windows are like semipermeable membranes,
which let  light in but thwart  the gaze from seeing outside (see Fig.  1).  Even if,  on rare occasions,  the
window does disclose the outside, there is a brick wall immediately behind the window blocking the gaze,
as in Dust Motes Dancing in the Sunbeams (1900). Hemkendreis illustrates this this exclusion of exteriority
by comparing Hammershøi’s Sleeping Room (1890) with Caspar David Friedrich’s compositionally similar
Woman at the Window (1822), in which a communication with the outside forms a crucial element of the
painting’s overall effect, whereas in Hammershøi’s case the inside and the outside are closed from each
other.xlii Similarly, Hammershøi’s use of windows could be contrasted to that of Edward Hopper, another
famous painter of silence, whose numerous depictions of people at a window – I’m thinking of paintings
like Summer in the City (1950), Morning Sun (1954), and Woman in the Sun (1961) – establish a view to the
outside, which endow the otherwise melancholic atmosphere with a sense of release. By excluding the
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viewer from penetrating the interior, Hammershøi creates a feeling of being imprisoned within the serene
apartment, whose toned-down atmosphere begins to resemble that of a grave. The interiors create a
feeling something akin to Mark Rothko’s experience of Michelangelo’s Laurentian Library, which “makes
the viewer feel that they are trapped in a room where all the doors and windows are bricked up, so that
all they can do is to butt their heads forever against the wall.”xliii The interiors close around the viewer,
making it difficult for the viewer to distance themselves from the pictorial space. This way the exteriority
of the paintings breaches the interiority of the viewer: I do not remain an external onlooker but become
as if enclosed within the airtight interior itself.
Heavy atmosphere. Though Hammershøi’s interiors are rather minimalist, they are still haunted by an
elusive, oppressive presence. There is a peculiar heaviness in this emptiness, as if the light filling the
rooms had acquired density. As Poul Vad points out, Hammershøi, unlike the Impressionists, does not
identify light and colour with each other. Thus in his interiors light is not something immaterial and in
itself invisible, showing itself in the colours it lights up, but rather something that concretely fills the
room.xliv I credit much of this effect to Hammershøi’s characteristic brush-strokes. Hammershøi paints
with short, stubby strokes and does not efface the traces of single strokes even on monochrome surfaces.
The result is that the colour fields have subtle variations, which create a sense of static reverberation (see
Fig. 1 and 2). Since the rooms are otherwise very toned-down and stripped, the slightly nervous buzzing
of the brushstrokes fills the pictorial space with an intangible density. This heaviness adds to the
suffocating effect of the hermetic pictorial space, increasing the smothering feeling of the enclosed
rooms. What is interesting is that this density, much like Levinas’s il y a, is not localizable or reducible to
any of the depicted objects – rather, the presence can be described, as Levinas describes the night, as an
“atmosphere of presence, […] a density of the void, a murmur of silence.”xlv This heaviness of the light,
like the night, trumps intentionality: there is “something” permeating Hammershøi’s rooms that can be
felt but not taken as an object of intentionality. Instead, in keeping with the breaching of the viewer’s
interiority, the paintings seem to invert the direction of the gaze: there’s not only the viewer looking at
the painting, but there’s also a strong feeling of being looked back by the rooms themselves.xlvi
Anonymity. Though Hammershøi paints his own apartment, there are hardly any signs of life present in
the paintings. The painter removes all anecdotal material so often associated with other interior painters
of the time and shows only the stage without a story. The rooms feel deserted, as if they were waiting for
someone to inhabit them. The colour palette is muted, ranging mainly in different shades of grey and
brown, as if livelier colours had faded away. When compared, for instance, with Carl Larsson’s images of
his home at Sundborn, brimming with life and laughter, Hammershøi’s apartment looks like an empty
husk of a home. It is a home, which has become un-homely, unheimlich. Like the insomniac’s bedroom in
Levinas’s descriptions, the apartment is filled with a present absence, which no longer facilitates dwelling.
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Sometimes strange details, like a table pushed against a door (as in Tate’s Interior, 1899), or paintings hung
high almost to the ceiling (Fig. 2), highlight the enigmatic atmosphere. Sometimes a mysterious woman,
dressed in black, lingers isolated in the apartment (Fig. 1). She remains withdrawn, her back usually turned
toward the viewer. Whereas in Dutch interior paintings, which highly inspired Hammershøi, the female
figure is usually depicted doing something – playing an instrument, reading a letter, making lace – the
woman’s activity in Hammershøi’s paintings remains meaningless.xlvii The viewer is offered no access to
her identity, her intentions, or hopes – she is just there, present. She makes no contact with the viewer,
nor does she interact with her surroundings. “Her presence is a complete vegetative state,” Vad notes.xlviii
Paradoxically, her presence offers no intersubjective support that would efface the suffocating stagnation
or explain the strangeness of the situation; instead, she only adds to the solitude and anonymity of the
interior, highlighting the fact that the viewer’s wish to crack open the mystery of the situation and catch
up with the movement of life remains forever unsatisfied.
Stagnation of time. The Norwegian painter Ida Lorentzen has accurately described Hammershøi’s interiors
as paintings of waiting.xlix Indeed, the rooms seem to be stuck in time, held in pure duration without
future. They portray an eternal, infuriating patience, as the empty rooms are filled with a foreboding that
no amount of waiting will resolve: there is a feeling that something is about to happen, but what – the
paintings never tell. Time stands still, nothing moves, except the non-localizable and unthematizable
reverberation of light and dust dancing in its rays. The rooms seem to be held in time, quite in the same
way as in Levinas’s thinking the temporality of a solitary subject is “a frozen instant, where the objects of
the world become like a winter landscape frozen in place.”l So, if Cézanne paints the birth of the world,
as Merleau-Ponty claims, then Hammershøi paints its stagnation; if the Impressionists attempt to capture
an instant in its ethereal fluidity, Hammershøi slows the instant to a halt. The pictorial means by which
he achieves this effect are difficult to pinpoint. The primary factor is that there is practically no movement
in the images. There are no cues about what is happening, no story to be told, nor is there such interaction
between the depicted objects that would endow the picture plane with a sense of temporal order. Even
the woman in black most often just stands or sits motionless. The interior simply is, without any visual
hints of temporal unfolding towards the future.
Adding up nothing. By way of summary, let me draw the parallels between Levinas’s descriptions of the il y
a and the experience of Hammershøi’s interiors. Earlier I outlined the Levinasian experience of
nothingness as entailing 1) haunting, anonymous presence, which 2) severs the subject from
intersubjective ties and chains them to their solitude, thereby 3) rendering them passive and incapable of
escaping the suffocating nothingness and 4) breaching their interiority, making them aware of their
enchainment to being as well as 5) stopping the unfolding of time towards the future and encapsulating
the subject in pure duration without releasement. By analysing various pictorial means by which
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Hammershøi composes his interiors, I identified the central ways these paintings effectuate an analogous
experience of impersonal, non-objectifiable, and static presence. I argued that though their tranquillity
surely does not amount to the dramatic horror of Levinas’s insomnia, the interiors induce an existential
mood highly resembling the Levinasian experience of nothingness. Hammershøi paints his apartment
and nothing more, and thereby he executes an enigmatic feat: by painting solely “the visible and the
concrete,” he also manages to paint something that haunts this visibility and concreteness as the excess
of their presence – something that turns out to be nothing.  The paradox of Hammershøi’s interiors, and
perhaps the very source of their captivation, lies in their uncanny ability to conjure the menacingly
invisible simply by capturing the visible in paint.
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